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at what the author believes are the unique contributions Murdoch made in 
Australia at this crucial period of the Japan-Australia relationship. 
1.2 Murdoch's Contributions 
In the history of any nation, there is a rare moment when the knowledge 
of a scholar is called upon to assist its leaders in determining the nation's 
direction. Murdoch's knowledge of Japan was called upon, though 
indirectly, at the critical moment in the Australia-Japan relationship. 
Murdoch responded to it in earnest. Aware of being the one who had most 
immediate knowledge of Japan, Murdoch attempted desperately to alert 
Australian leaders to their errors in interpreting Japan's intentions and to 
the imminent danger their errors could cause. Although his advice fell 
short of changing the mainstream thinking of Australian leaders, a number 
of documents remain today as evidence of his conscientious effort. 
In the course of investigating Murdoch's life, guided by Meaney's excellent 
work, Fears and Phobias (Meaney 1996), the author came upon a number 
of letters and documents, which vividly describe Murdoch's efforts in this 
sphere. They also give a glimpse into that crucial moment in Australia's 
history relative to Japan. 
In order to discuss Murdoch's contributions in this sphere, it is necessary to 
introduce Edmund L. Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence between 
1916-19, head of the Pacific Branch and Foreign Affairs Section of the 
Prime Minister's Department between 1919-23. Murdoch's major 
contributions took the form of being a personal friend and adviser to 
Piesse. 
As previously mentioned, after Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, Australia's 
attention was keenly turned to Japan. The policy-makers, their official 
advisers, and those intellectuals, who had an interest in foreign affairs, 
began serious assessment of both Japan's intentions and British policy in 
the Pacific. Piesse was among those who drew little comfort from the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He did not hold much faith in the willingness 
and capability of Britain to protect Australia from the threat of Japan in 
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the Pacific.
When Britain became involved in the European war in 1914, Piesse 
responded in accordance with the strict intent of Australia's defence 
planning. He made clear that his first concern was Australia's security in 
the Pacific, and stated that he had `no mind to volunteer for a European 
war'. He further declared that he was `bound only to serve in the defence 
of Australia' (Meaney 1996). After Japan entered the war as Britain's ally, 
rather than feeling complacent, Piesse feared that Japan might take 
advantage of the war to further its ambitions in Asia and the Pacific. 
Piesse needed reliable information sources in order to make his own 
assessment of the current situation and to predict Japan's future policy 
directions. He was uneasy with the long-standing arrangements in the 
Commonwealth, in which Australia heavily relied on Britain for 
intelligence information, including that which concerned the Pacific. He 
was afraid that Australia could risk its own security by constantly looking 
to Britain for vital intelligence information. He reasoned that the British 
viewed the Far Eastern question from a different perspective, and that 
British representatives were not always sympathetic to Australia's interests. 
In November 1917, in response to Defence Minister Pearce's request for 
advice, Piesse suggested that Australia should establish its own Foreign 
Affairs section, rather than relying on Britain. The proposed section could 
provide the Australian government with full and reliable information 
relating to all Australian concerns, such as Japan's attitude to the `White 
Australia Policy', the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and, more 
generally, the need for defence against Far Eastern nations. What Piesse 
was proposing was, in effect, the creation of an Australian Foreign Office 
(ibid.: 12-13). 
Piesse also recommended that the Australian government should make 
more use of Murdoch's expert knowledge of Japan. The government 
supported the decision by the University of Sydney to promote Murdoch 
to a professorship in Oriental Studies, and provided the funds for the chair 
on the condition that Murdoch would travel to Japan during the long 
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vacation period. Underlining this understanding was that the information 
Murdoch obtained through his extensive contacts in Japan would be made 
available to the government (Piesse 1918).
By 1917, Piesse himself had started his study of the Japanese language in 
order to read Japanese newspapers and other source materials by himself. 
He also befriended Murdoch and came to respect the scholar. Piesse valued 
Murdoch's living knowledge of Japan and his intelligent perception as a 
man who had lived in Japan for nearly twenty five years. Murdoch in turn 
encouraged Piesse in his study of the language. Murdoch's influence, 
together with the information Piesse himself was able to gather through his 
own reading of Japanese material, gradually began to modify Piesse's 
hitherto held perception of Japan. Piesse had held an alarmist view of 
Japan when he took up the office of the Director of Military Intelligence 
in 1916. By 1918, he had become a more moderate and realistic observer 
of Japan. Meaney describes the better informed Piesse of 1918 by drawing 
attention to the informal submission Piesse made to Pearce, the Defence 
Minister, in 1918:
Piesse, instead of stressing the danger from Japan, raised doubts 
about Australias preoccupation with that country and therefore 
about the level of defence expenditure. After reviewing the 
records about Japan in all the Departments; he considered that 
our policy of defence against Japan is inadequately supported by 
evidence. It was his view that `hitherto her eyes have not been 
turned to us', and he added that Japanese public opinion 'is 
coming to have more influence and there is a growing opposition 
to any aggressive policy that might lead to war.' (Meaney 
1996:12)
During the long vacation of 1918 -1919, Murdoch travelled to Japan and 
stayed from October 1918 to March 1919. His primary mission, besides 
the obvious purpose of collecting materials for teaching, was to obtain 
first-hand knowledge of Japan's policy in this uncertain period immediately 
following the war. Before his departure for Japan, Piesse and Murdoch 
established a direct personal channel of communication. Murdoch was to
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write to Piesse at his home, addressing him as Mr. McCrae. McCrae was 
Mrs Piesse's maiden name. This precaution was taken to avoid the 
possible interception of letters by the Japanese authorities. 
In his first letter addressed to Mr. McCrae from Japan on 6th December 
1918, Murdoch's tone was optimistic: 
     Things now in Japan are vastly better than they were last year. 
     The set-back that militarism has met with in Europe has its 
    effect here; (Murdoch 1918a) 
Murdoch further reported that the Japanese seemed to be fully alive to the 
danger in which militarism would result, and that `some publishers have 
opened a great fight against militarism'. He further commented that `the 
outlook seems to be improving' and that Japan was ` much more amenable 
to "sweet reasonableness" than it has been for the last decade or so'(ibid.). 
Murdoch seemed to have made full use of the extensive contacts with a 
wide range of people, both amongst Japanese and foreign residents, that 
he had in Japan. 
     I've been very busy here, have had to meet all kinds of people, 
     from Ambassadors and Vice-Ministers down to my friends the 
    journalists. (Murdoch 1918b) 
Murdoch was granted an interview with Shidehara Kijuro, Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. He also had two sessions of meetings, each lasting two 
hours, with Roland Morris, the American Ambassador, which he reported 
as very useful. Murdoch's efforts in Japan were focused on gaining the most 
up-to-date information from the widest possible range of sources, so that 
he could paint an accurate picture of the current situation in Japan. It is 
evident that he conducted this work more as a conscientious scholar, 
rather than as a politically motivated envoy. 
While Murdoch was still in Japan, the Peace Conference was proceeding in 
Paris with Prime Minister William Hughes heading the Australian 
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delegation. The situation which developed there shook Murdoch's 
optimism to the foundations. He had to make a quick re-assessment of the 
new political situation in Japan, which was developing as the result of the 
Paris Conference. At the Paris Conference, Hughes spearheaded the 
opposition to the Japanese delegates' desire to include a racial equality 
clause in the League of Nations Covenant. Japan reacted as news arrived 
from Paris. Murdoch had the opportunity to observe at first hand what 
effects it had on Japan. On his way home, hardly waiting for his ship to 
reach Australian shores, while still being kept in quarantine, he wrote to 
Piesse, sounding an alarm bell,
This racial discrimination agitation extends all over Japan; and 
it has been engineered by the military party. It may very well 
become dangerous if not met properly. I talked to the Japanese 
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs about the matter and I have 
had several dinners with my journalistic friends where I 
debated on the matter.... This racial discrimination business is 
the most important thing just now... (Murdoch 1919a)
Piesse, through his own reading of Japanese newspapers, was already aware 
of new developments in Japan. Information brought back by Murdoch, 
and the scholar's perception of events, further alerted Piesse to potential 
danger. On 24th March, shortly after receiving briefings from Murdoch,' 
Piesse sent the Chief of the General Staff a memorandum concerning `The 
Present Movement in Japan against Racial Discrimination', which was 
based on Japanese press reports, `as interpreted by a gentleman lately from 
the East' (Piesse 1919a). It is no doubt that the gentleman referred to was 
Murdoch.
In the memorandum, Piesse reported that `all Japan is boiling with this cry 
for racial equality'. Alerted to the danger that this sensitive issue could be 
exploited by the factions in the Japan's military for their expansionist 
purposes, Piesse, in the memorandum, made a recommendation to the 
effect that Western leaders should consider this issue in a more 
sympathetic manner. He further recommended that they meet `the 
reasonable wishes' of Japan's public opinion, in the hope of assisting those
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democratic forces opposed to the militarists and imperialists. Piesse 
severely criticised Prime Minister Hughes' opposition to Japan's proposal 
for recognition of racial equality. He referred to Hughes' speeches at the 
Paris Conference and declared that those speeches `could not fail to be 
offensive to a high spirited people'. Piesse further stated that the effect on 
Japan that Hughes' speeches had made was `most serious', that they had 
helped to weaken liberal influences on Japanese policy and had given 
ammunition to those ultra-nationalists who desired to keep Japan out of 
the League of Nations (ibid.). 
Three days after sending the memorandum, Piesse wrote to Watt, the 
Acting Prime Minister, with whom he had close personal contact, 
describing a set of proposals prepared by Murdoch for the purpose of 
appeasing the Japanese. The proposals included the recommendation that 
`the Australian government accord Japanese the same right of entry as 
Europeans' and that `the government should delete from the Naturalisation 
Act the provision forbidding the naturalisation of Asians' (Piesse 1919b; 
Watt 1919).
In the meantime, Murdoch continued his efforts to be in close touch with 
developments in Japan. The information coming from Japan was 
disturbing and only served to increase his anxiety. Hughes' strong 
opposition to Japan's proposal of the racial equality clause was coming 
from the Prime Minister's notion that the proposal, if adopted, would 
seriously pose a threat to the `White Australia Policy'. On this Murdoch 
wrote to Piesse:
We can maintain the White Australia policy intact I believe, if 
we go about it in the right way: and that, too, without any 
fighting, and with very little unpleasantness. If we continue to 
play the game of the Japanese Military clique, it is quite possible 
that there will be something a good deal worse than a little 
unpleasantness. .... the military coterie, just when it was 
beginning to be otherwise discredited, has been able to range the 
whole Empire (of Japan) as an integral unit behind them. 
(Murdoch 1919b)
27
In his letter to Piesse two weeks later, Murdoch's tone carried more 
urgency. Murdoch warned, in his characteristic style, of the possibility that 
this racial issue would develop into an outbreak of hostilities. 
    If we give Japan the opportunity of rising as the champion of the 
     coloured races, we are playing a sorry game for ourselves. 
    (Murdoch 1919c)
He went further 
consequences:
and even made his prediction on the far-reaching
We drive Japan to seek alliances, and by 1938 or so, we have 
Germany, Russia and Japan acting together -Japan in control 
over the inexhaustible resources of China. (ibid.)
Considering that the letter was written in 1919, 
prediction and demonstrates the extent of the grasp 
scholar had on the situation involving Japan.
this was a remarkable 
that this well-travelled
One month later, the news on the further developments at the Paris Peace 
Conference did not ease Piesse's anxiety. He confided his disquiet in his 
letter to Lt. Commander J. G. Latham, a former director of Naval 
Intelligence and a member of the Australian delegation at the Peace 
Conference:
The whole business in Paris seems to have gone badly for us, 
from our apparent lack of cordiality towards the United States 
to the barren victory over racial discrimination. How much 
better it would have been to accept the Japanese amendment in 
one of its least noxious forms and rely on the opportunities the 
Covenant of the League gives to protect ourselves from any 
unfavourable interpretation. As it is we have been perhaps the 
chief factor in consolidating the whole Japanese nation behind 
the imperialists - and it needs little imagination to see how 
serious that may be with Japan's now assured opportunities 
expanding her power through China's resources. (Piesse 1919c)
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In May 1919, the Cabinet agreed to establish a Pacific Branch of the Prime 
Minister's Department, the forerunner of the Australia's Department of 
Foreign Affairs. In the same month, Piesse was appointed to the post of 
Director of the Pacific Branch. Although Piesse was the initial instigator of 
the idea of Australia's own Foreign Affairs office, Piesse's appointment 
came as a surprise in the light of his severe criticism of Prime Minister 
Hughes for the latter's lack of diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference. It 
is understood, however, that the acting Prime Minister Watt had been a 
strong supporter of Piesse. 
For his first major task as the Director, Piesse proposed an extensive tour of 
the Far East to make his own assessment of the situation in the region. 
The Cabinet accepted his proposal. From September 1919 to March 1920, 
Piesse travelled to Portuguese Timor, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, 
French Indo-China and China. One of his major tasks was to evaluate 
Japanese influence on, and penetration of the region. The grand tour 
ended with his five-week stay in Japan. 
In Japan, Piesse consulted with wide range of people, including 
representatives from Britain and the United States. Piesse considered, 
however, that the most important discussion he had conducted in Japan 
was the one with Masanao Hanihara, Japan's Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The meeting took place at Gaimusho on 25th December 1919. 
Also present at the meeting was S. Shimizu, Consul-General of Japan at 
Sydney. The content of this discussion is found today in the `Notes of 
Statements' made by Piesse and in Hanihara's written reply, both kept in 
the Australian Archives.
In the meeting, Piesse raised multiple issues concerning the two countries, 
including Australia's anxiety about Japan's so called `southward expansion', 
her policy towards China, trade and attitudes of the Japanese press. Rather 
than describing each issue discussed, however, we will focus on the racial 
discrimination issue alone, as this issue caused the major difference of 
opinion between Piesse and mainstream Australian leaders.
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Explaining his position as `a personal and unofficial capacity', Piesse made 
his presentation in remarkably candid manner. He first explained the 
historical background which led Australia to the restrictive immigration 
policy, known as the `White Australia Policy', although he avoided the 
terminology. He then described how the `events of the Peace Conference 
have given rise to further anxiety'. 
     The Iabanese brobosal in regard to the removal of restrictions on
     immigration seemed to threaten what most Australians regard as 
     an absolutely vital policy. (Piesse 1919d, underline by Piesse) 
In the meeting, Hanihara, instead of making an immediate response, 
requested Piesse for the written note of his statements, and promised him a 
written response at a later date. Piesse received Hanihara's response in 
Manila on his way home on 20th February 1920. 
In his response, Hanihara expressed that he valued Piesse's information all 
the more as it was given in `all candour and unreserve'. On the issue of 
Japan's proposal on racial equality at the Paris Conference, Hanihara states 
Japan's position in very clear terms; 
     ... the utterances of Japanese delegates and steps taken by them at 
     the Conference, demonstrate that Japan's object was not "the 
     removal of restrictions on immigration ; but the elimination of 
     racial discrimination - a discrimination which,for no reason 
     but of the colour of skin deprives men of equal opportunity in 
     life and often subjects them to an unbearablehumiliation. 
    (Hanihara 1920) 
Hanihara went further to assure Piesse that he `does not hesitate to admit 
the unwarrantableness of any attempt to deprive a state of its right to 
restrict immigration', and that `Japan would never agree to an international 
agreement of the kind'. Hanihara, however, once again reiterated that 
Japan ` strongly opposes a discrimination because of race'. 
Japan's frustration towards the western powers of the time was brought to 
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light when Hanihara stated in a later part of the response: 
 Japan has the misfortune of being a non-Christian and non-
 white Power, and has in consequence to undergo experiences, 
 which are not even dreamt of by a European or American 
 Power. ...... All she (Japan) wants is a fair and equal 
 opportunity for her people's legitimate and peaceful activities. 
 (ibid.)
Piesse sent Hanihara's response to Prime Minister Hughes on 17th March 
1920. Conscious that Hughes interpreted Japan's proposal of racial 
equality at the Peace Conference as posing a threat to Australia's 
immigration policy, Piesse, in his cover letter, called the Prime Minister's 
attention to the following:
Of the opinions expressed by Mr. Hanihara in this statement, 
the most interesting to Australia is the admission of "the 
unwarrantableness of any attempt to deprive a state of its right 
to restrict immigration" : (Piesse 1920a)
Two days later, on 22nd March 1920, Piesse sent a comprehensive report 
to the Prime Minister based on his own observations in Japan. In it, he 
endeavoured to paint an accurate picture of the Japanese situation, and 
urged that Australia should understand the reasons behind Japan's policy, 
rather than interpreting her intentions as purely that of the imperialists. 
He referred to the commonly held view in Australia and in the West that 
Japan had a policy of acquiring territory for the sake of acquisition. Piesse 
stated:
In Japan, I found a very different view taken by nearly all of the 
British and American residents with whom I spoke. They 
considered that expansion for expansion's sake played only a 
small part in determining Japan's policy.. They held that the 
reasons for expansion were rather the need of satisfying economic 
wants and of security against overseas attack: (Piesse 1920b)
Piessewent on painstakingly to explain the situationin which Japanwas
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Japan, like many countries of Europe, is reaching, or has already 
reached, the stage at which she can exist only by obtaining food 
from distant agricultural countries and paying for it by exports 
of her own manufactures. Japanese Imperialism, (in the 
opinions of the experts Piesse met in Japan), is nothing more 
than the policy of safeguarding supplies of food, and of raw 
materials and of ensuring access to markets. (ibid.)
Of the prevailing fear of Japan felt in Australia, Piesse stated:
     So far as it concerned Australia, both diplomatists and naval 
     and military attaches told me that they never heard Australia 
     mentioned by the Japanese with whom theymixed.- and that it 
     was quite incredible to them that Japan could have any plans of 
     aggression in the immediate future against Australia. (ibid.) 
The nine-page report prepared by Piesse is comprehensive, touching all the 
vital issues Japan faced at that time. His interpretation of Japan's situation 
was as close to accuracy as any outsider could perceive at that time. The 
painstakingly prepared report, however, fell on deaf ears as far as Australia's 
leaders were concerned. The report reached the Government at the time 
when it was considering the defence expenditure of 1920 - 1921. The 
recommendations contained in the report ran counter to the advice given 
by the British Admiralty and Australia's own defence authorities. Meaney 
describes the ideas held by British advisers and Australia's defence 
authorities:
They reflected earlier strategic perspective which had hardened 
into dogma, almost a racially based dogma, and they appealed 
to the bureaucratic ambitions of the armed forces. (Meaney 
1996: 26-27)
Meaney went on to say:
Hughes and Pearce, like their defence advisers, could not easily
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     overcome their fear of the `Yellow Peril'. (ibid.:27) 
History took the course as we know it today. Piesse, much assisted by 
Murdoch's information and his encouragement, made desperate efforts to 
break the dogma held by authorities and open their eyes to the true picture 
of the situation. Although Piesse's efforts, and Murdoch's efforts behind it, 
did not save the deteriorating relations between Australia and Japan, the 
value of those efforts should still be appraised today.
The issues involving Australia and Japan during the turbulent era between 
the two wars were complex and interrelated. It was, however, intentional 
that this study focused only on the racial equality issue, as the purpose of 
the discussion was to examine Murdoch's involvement in the issue. The 
evidence highlights Murdoch's effort to influence Australian leaders with 
an accurate interpretation of the Japanese situation, which few other 
Australians could provide at the time.
Neither does this report intend to exaggerate Murdoch's influence over 
Piesse. Piesse himself looked for truth. Murdoch was simply an 
instrument for that purpose, and a very conscientious one. Another fact 
not to be overlooked was that Murdoch also made his own effort. He met 
a number of people of influence, including the Prime Minister, to discuss 
Japan. His endeavours continued until his death. There remains a letter 
written by Murdoch to Prime Minister Hughes only a few months before 
his death, requesting one more meeting to discuss the possible danger of 
`America drifting into war with Japan within the next ten years (Murdoch 
1921)'. It is not known whether or not Murdoch was granted the 
meeting.
In 1923, less than two years after Murdoch's death, Piesse resigned from 
the Pacific Branch. It is reported that he had felt increasingly ineffectual in 
his post at the helm of the Branch (Walker and Ingleson 1989:305). 
Murdoch's death together with Piesse's departure from his key post 
certainly deprived Australian leaders of opportunities for informed 
discussion on Japan. It is easy to speculate that this provided less restraint 
to the rising voices of alarmists in the country.
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